The rising Chinese Navy – where to | Oslo Militære Samfund

Oberst Gjert Lage Dyndal er sjef operasjoner ved Nasjonalt luftoperasjonssenterpå Reitan, og haren bistilling i strategi og kriseledelse ved Handelshøyskolen, Nord universitet.

Examined in perspective classic western naval strategic thinking
BY GJERT LAGE DYNDAL

The exceptional rise of the Chinese Navy – the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – has attracted much attention in recent years. On observation, its expansion is indeed extraordinary. Not in sheer numbers – as it was already known as a ‘1000 ship Navy’ during the Cold War – but it was a very different (balanced) navy then and served another purpose than that of the global US Navy. What distinguishes the Chinese Navy today is an increase in larger and more powerful capabilities: modern missile frigates and destroyers, amphibious forces and the early stages of development of an aircraft carrier fleet. What lies behind these changes; what are they all about?

There are diverging interpretations of the strategic rationale for these developments, and differing projections of what type the Chinese Navy will become. In reviewing the US annual reports to Congress on China’s military and security developments, you clearly sense the unease about China as a rising naval global competitor. The title of a noticeable article by James Fanell is indicative of such views: “China’s global naval strategy and expanding force structure, pathway to hegemony”. Similarly, the many conferences, books and articles name-dropping the naval strategist Mahan in this regard give a clear impression of a global reach, warfighting navy on the rise. However, are these descriptions and expectations supported by what China has actually developed, and what we see on the horizon?

This article will review and assess the evolving Chinese naval strategy against established sea power strategic thinking and theory in perspective future global reach. Earlier sea power thinking provides lessons for the Chinese, and it is only natural that they take advantage of learning from others and the past. In addition, a comparison to former sea power perspectives serves as a helpful theoretical framework to try to understand what kind of Chinese navy is taking shape.

The classic Sea Power thinking lenses

All military forces develop according to their national needs, and all military forces and cultures are unique. Still, there are obvious lessons to learn from comparable stories of the past. Sea power theories and history provide us usable, basic references to understand Chinese naval developments. In fact, the Chinese Navy benefits from political backing and state funding, and also has the advantage of being able to learn from others and to create all new modern capabilities. It will face challenges in terms of training and exercises, and for now lacks conventional combat experience but so do comparable navies. Consequently, to try to understand what we see developing, a look at Sea Power theory as a reference is valuable.

Debates on Sea Power have changed over time, from debates of the ‘Command of the Sea’, which largely dominated from the 1890s till the end of the Cold War, to an increased focus on power projection since the Cold War due to the strategic challenges of the last decades (i.e. the Balkans, the Middle East and Afghanistan, and back again to the Middle East and Africa). Now strategy discussions on ‘Command of the Sea’ are re-emerging as the world again becomes more politically and militarily ‘multi-polar’ and competitive in general, but also as a consequence of China’s increasingly assertive policies in the South China Sea However, from a historical perspective, any analysis on Sea Power for global reach, the main focus, must encapsulate both enduring elements of global sea power: commanding the sea and using the sea for greater purposes.

The terminology Command (or Mastery) of the Sea is accredited to Alfred T. Mahan. He is well known for his belief in the decisive battle as the main tactic for achieving this aim. Mahan attached particular importance to strategy and tactics as war- winning factors in their own right, and was mainly focused on the fleet. Corbett was in contrast to Mahan not so much occupied with the thought of Command of the Sea as that of ‘communication’, or the use of the sea for greater purposes. Corbett argued rather that Command of the Sea was useful only in so far as it allowed a navy to carry out its political interests and to collaborate closely with the army. Even though Corbett is viewed as not adhering to Mahan’s emphasis on Command of the Sea, and the decisive battle as the means, Corbett nevertheless did appreciate it. He stated: ‘First, there is the general recognition, always patent to ourselves, that by far the most drastic, economical, and effective way of securing control is to destroy the enemy’s means of interfering with it’. However, Corbett foremost argued that the use of the sea – what he called ‘communication’ – was the object of naval warfare. He argued that with safe communication as the sole purpose, exercising and safeguarding the necessary local or regional sea control for being able to use the sea should be the focus.

A considerable number of Sea Power debates have been on ‘sea control’, be it by Command of the Sea or for the use of the sea. However, medium-power strategists were typically focused on concepts for those nations unable to seek out the enemy for large or decisive battles. For instance, the French admiral Raoul Castex’s answer was to build a navy on the maritime strategy and tactics of ‘manoeuvre’. This included naval raids on enemy communication and less capable ships, use of mines, and limited amphibious operations. He, like Corbett, constituted clearly an alternative to Mahan and those in favour of the ‘decisive battle’. His thoughts are very important for the medium and smaller powers that face superior forces. Castex’s theories also lead one into Russian naval thinking, especially to the writings of Sergei G. Gorshkov. Early Soviet strategies (prior to the Second World War) have been paralleled to the principles of the French Jeune Ecoletradition, the use of smaller units to combat larger battleships in regional and coastal combat, and commerce raiders capable of ending the trade of the rival nation. This was for a limited period followed by a classical capital-ship focus under Stalin – similar to the German Tirpezian ‘Risk Fleet’ ideas, but then returned to a more alternative and original thinking under Admiral Gorshkov. Under his leadership, from the late 1950s till the early 1980s, the world saw a build-up of an alternative but impressive navy focused around submarines and long-range air power, supported by the surface fleet. In this sense, Gorshkov promoted much of the same fundamental ideas as Castex. Gorshkov built naval and maritime air forces for manoeuvre, but also with a great emphasis on sea denial.

Using former naval strategic perspectives to assess China’s naval developments today, we see that there is a great variety of thinking on what a ‘blue water navy’ can be, and we see significant differences in thinking between the two leading great power naval strategists, Mahan and Corbett. Even though Corbett supports much of Mahan’s thinking on the ‘Command of the Sea’, he does not see this as the main objective of naval forces. In Corbett’s view, the use of the sea – ‘communication’ – is the central issue. As this leads to a different type of naval (and air) capabilities, the difference on these issues become important for using their perspectives in an analysis of China today and for the future.

Modern Chinese naval thinking

The Chinese Navy has evolved through three distinct phases in recent history. During the Cold War the strategic focus was on ‘coastal defence’. At that time, the Chinese armed forces, under Army dominance, were mainly preparing for an ‘early, total, and nuclear war’ against a possible Soviet invasion. Starting in the 1980s, during a period of regional expansion, the focus extended to ‘offshore defense’. In recent years, we have witnessed a gradual development towards a balanced naval strategy of both ‘offshore defense’ and a focus on global interests, ultimately leading to ‘open seas protection’ as spelled out in the 2015 Maritime Strategy. It now seems obvious that the PLAN is evolving into a global reach ‘blue navy’. However, what kind is still unclear.

Coastal Defence

China has foremost been an Asian continental power, with a regional maritime focus. It does have a proud maritime history, yet only sporadically outside its regional waters during periods of great economic expansion. Historical periods of global expansion to note include the 12-14th and 16-17th centuries with periodic regional naval build-ups and battles; and especially the ‘expeditionary fleet’ of the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century. In the following centuries, China remained an important maritime trade nation, well integrated in the then globalized maritime system.

During the Cold War and the Mao era, the Chinese Navy was clearly subordinate to the Army, and the Navy’s role was limited to that of ‘coastal defence’, or ‘near-coast defence’. The Navy consisted of more than 1000 ships, but these were mainly missile armed patrol boats. This defensive strategy was based on three elements: Maritime ‘guerrilla’ operations, using smaller combatants and air power to harass and disperse enemy forces; focused naval attacks on enemy sea lines and offensive enemy forces; regional coastal naval operations under cover of land-based aircraft. The policies became more forward leaning from 1980 onward, with the “Active Defence” strategy.

Expanding, first regional – then global: From Liu Huaqing to Wu Shengli

The Chinese Navy discussed here came to life under Liu Huaqing (1916–2011), who served as both Army General and Navy Admiral but is best known for his service as Commander of the Chinese Navy from August 1982 till January 1988. In the 1980s and by many since, he has been referred to as the ‘Father of the Modern Chinese Navy’, and had a status equivalent to Admiral Gorshkov in the Soviet Union.

Liu Huaqing is credited with developing the idea of a three-step development for a modern Chinese Navy. This arose in the mid-1980s when relations with the Soviet Union began to improve. The political leadership then ordered the armed forces to make a ‘strategic transition’ from preparing for major war with the Soviet Union, to realigning the focus to be able to fight ‘local wars’. To what degree Liu Huaqing was the true architect of the new naval strategic thinking that followed is dubious. Nevertheless, he did play an influential role in its development. He argued that China as a first phase of ‘near-seas active defence’ needed to build the capability to control the nearby waters out to ‘the first island chain’, by renovating and upgrading its fleet and training crew. This was later planned to be achieved by 2000.

Then a second phase, lasting until 2020 according to Chinese plans, consists in improving combat forces to ensure its interests in the ‘near-seas’, and to be capable of projecting force out to ‘the second island chain’. These two steps are often referred to as ‘offshore defence’. This was about defending China’s maritime coastline from attack and safeguarding its interests within its claimed maritime territories. The Chinese leadership has viewed this as a defensive strategy, while others in the region clearly have felt intimidated and pressured. Many Western analysts have argued that the naval developments over the last decade have been focused foremost on ‘anti-access’.

Already in the 1980s, Liu Huaqing made a plea for medium size aircraft carriers for mainly two reasons: ‘to solve the need for struggle against Taiwan [independence] and to resolve the dispute over the Nansha [Spratlys] Archipelago’. He further stressed that the purpose was not to compete with the US and the Soviet Union. In his view, these carriers were intended for the regional tasks of ‘offshore defence’, not for global reach decisive battle. As for these early phases, his ideas were clearly not of a ‘Mahanian’ style, even though many have argued that he was influenced by Mahan. Nor do the developments resemble other alternative naval strategy perspectives such as the French ‘Jeune Ecole’ school or Castex’s ‘Manoeuvre Fleet’, nor the German ‘Risk Fleet’ or equivalent ideas from Stalin. However, the two early phases of Liu Huaqing’s ideas, the ‘offshore defence’ strategy, largely resemble many of Gorshkov’s ideas and the ‘sea denial’ components of the Soviet Navy.

Despite serving much of his early career in the Army, Liu Huaqing had a long naval career, including as a student at the Soviet Voroshilov [naval] Academy, today’s Kuznetsov Naval Academy. His naval career also included serving at the Chinese Dalian Naval Academy, as well as with naval research and development institutes. He later headed national military research. So, he had a broad background upon which to draw for the development of his naval thinking. Liu Huaqing’s ideas were largely accepted as doctrine during his period as Commander of the Chinese Navy in the 1980s. The Central Military Commission’s (CMC) approval of his blueprint in 1985 is viewed as a defining moment. He was allegedly also a personal friend of the then leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, which explains some of his influence and follow-on career after leaving the Navy. However, going from ideas to realization is not a given. The new naval strategic ideas did find some support owing to the dramatic international changes around 1990.

As the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended, China was no longer under imminent threat of war. The view of the Chinese leadership at the time was that they could enjoy a relatively peaceful situation for the foreseeable future. Thus, China could abandon the constant pre-war posture and focus more on modernization. The focus on modernization of the Chinese Armed Forces and strengthening the capability for extended defence were further boosted in the years following the US-led First Gulf War, which spurred concerns about the unipolar situation and the US dominance and will to use force on the international arena. After leaving his position as Commander of the Navy, Liu Huaqing sat on the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee from 1992 to 1997 and acted as Vice-Chairman of the CMC into the mid-1990s. He was then in a position to influence the course of development and the Navy’s funding was increased considerably. Another crucial moment was the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which further strengthened the determination to develop stronger regional military capabilities. Maritime affairs received a lot of attention during the 15th party congress in 1997, as well as during the subsequent congresses of 2002, 2007 and 2012. Already in 2013 as Xi Jinping entered as President, he stated ‘China should forcefully develop high-end and advanced oceanic technologies in order to build China into a maritime power…’

As for the third phase, beyond 2020, the intent and plans have been more ambiguous. Maybe Liu Huaqing didn’t even know himself, and in any case changing realities often overtake long-term planning. He believed that the Chinese Navy would be confined to its regional waters for a long time, but that eventually the economy and technological base would lead to an expansion of China’s naval power in the long run. When Liu Huaqing retired, the main proponent of carrier aviation disappeared. In the 1990s, central civilian leaders, such as Jiang Zemin, gained influence and followed a course which highlighted ‘soft approaches’. Aircraft carriers did not fit this line of policy.

The Chinese Navy continued its gradual rise under the successive leaderships of Zhang Lianzhong, Shi Yunsheng and Zhang Dingfa. From the early 2000s, Chinese naval analysts started discussing the need for shifting the focus to ‘far-sea’ operations. Between 2006 and 2017, mainly the era of Wu Shengli as Commander of the Navy, the Chinese naval rise became more noticeable. Under Wu Shengli, the Chinese Navy grew, not in numbers but with larger, better and more capable ships, and China became more globally focused. The Navy, now commanded by Shen Jinlong, is organised in three main fleets: the North Sea Fleet (Yellow Sea), the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet.

While the intention today seems to point to the development of a blue-water navy, what type, for what purpose and at what strength remain to be seen. We do know that President Xi Jinping and numerous other officials have promised a modernized military force by 2035, and a global ‘first-tier force’ by 2049 – the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.

So, what type of navy do we see today? A ‘Mahanian’ navy or something else? As with many other sea power theorists of middle size maritime powers, Liu Huaqing also employed the classic terms of command of the sea, use of the sea, and sea control but does not define them. Mahan’s logic involved assuring commercial, political, and military access, as argued by James Holmes as rationale for his and Toshi Yoshihara’s much quoted understanding of the modern Chinese development as ‘Mahanian’. However, one cannot look away from Mahan’s equally strong focus on the ‘decisive battle’ as the central means to achieve this. That is what separated Mahan from others, and notably Julian Corbett. Where Mahan stressed the need for acquiring lasting Command of the Sea through the decisive battle, Corbett believed that an ‘absolute’ Command of the Sea was neither possible nor necessary. It would be too costly. He argued that the blue water navy should be focused on protection of sea lines of communication and power projection.

Even though there are clearly elements of ‘Mahanian thinking’ in the Chinese case, the many popular references to Mahan and his influence on Chinese thinking give the wrong picture, taking into account official political statements and plans, as well as concrete developments. It is misleading even if one were to understand ‘Command of the Sea’ in a relative sense of it not being about possession, but about achieving a situation where one safely and effectively can use and exploit the sea for one’s own purposes, both militarily and commercially. Mahan, Corbett and many others have supported this position. However, the Mahanian references would also imply that the Chinese Navy is building up for a ‘decisive battle’ to ensure lasting Command of the Sea, but this we don’t see, at least not yet. The capabilities of the Chinese Navy are not yet there, and as of today we do not see concrete plans for building such capabilities and the necessary global naval infrastructure.

Where do we see it heading?

Too much emphasis is put on either individuals or concrete state affairs decisions. However, most developments are before this strongly and gradually influenced by debates and the result of compromises, between ideas and internal political possibilities, and according to available funding. In the case of China, as in other countries, books are published and debates are lively in military journals, as for instance the Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China Military Science], a journal edited by the Academy of Military Science. In Western circles, many books and analyses have been published over the last decade, and good articles are also regularly presented for instance in the China Quarterly journal and by the US Naval War College.

Today, the Chinese Navy has fulfilled the first two phases of Liu Huaqing’s ideas. They do have the capability to deny outside forces in wartime and to project force in its near-seas. About the ambiguous third phase, the ideas are less clear. Indeed, the political leadership has been divided and cautious on the approach to extend its influence. Many Chinese commentators pushed for greater international involvement, for instance in anti-piracy operations, while others remained concerned about international perceptions of a Chinese naval build-up.

The ‘Two-Ocean Strategy’, referred to in Chinese literature over the last decade, can serve as background for understanding the duality of regional tasks: (1) the extension of the traditional coastal defence to ‘near-seas’ ambitions, and (2) the increased focus on developing ‘far-seas’ capabilities. This is not an official or definite strategy or concept. In its broader Sea Power theoretical sense, these ideas could be understood as the delimitation between the regional tasks and the extended, global tasks. In a more definite understanding it refers to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. In both cases, China still lacks the capabilities to protect its sea lines of communication and to project power in wartime to the India Ocean, or other ‘far-seas’.

It is also important to keep in mind the wider geopolitical perspective to capture the extent of Chinese maritime growth. First of all, mainland China ports account for 70% of the top ten ports in the world, and now they extend worldwide with the international network. Not just in the noticeable Indo-Pacific, but also in South America, most recently with its majority share in Chancay Port in Peru. Similarly, it is devoting efforts to build competence and capabilities in the Arctic and to a lesser degree in Antarctica, to acquire access to resources and future economic opportunities. Sufficient maritime infrastructure and bilateral partnerships are paramount to sustaining an operational blue water navy. There is a clear trend that China is expanding its maritime civilian infrastructure. To what extent this infrastructure can and will be used for military purposes is an important indicator to watch for potential global naval reach. Djibouti in the Red Sea was the first true naval base to be developed, but we have also seen attempts to establish Chinese bases in Cambodia and Thailand, and lastly in the South Pacific Islands.

Maritime and naval support to the State

Western, and especially American led research and official assessment tend to be extremely deterministic towards a great fleet, capable of challenging the US fleet dominating the global scene today. As Yoshihara and Holmes argue: “To all appearances, China resolved to venture out to sea decades ago”. However, the intent of the Chinese naval build-up is difficult to assess. Normally, a nation’s intent is fluctuating, adapting to the wider international dynamics, which provide both challenges and opportunities. Two important aspects of Chinese naval developments, which explain what they are developing today, are China’s positive experience of the peaceful use of its strong expeditionary sea power under Zheng He some 600 years ago – which is remembered with pride; and China’s current view of the important relationship between its sea power and its pursuit of national development.

For years, the main focus has been on securing its regional sovereignty and interests, but also security of supply-lines for commerce and markets overseas. The security of energy supplies transiting critical sea lanes has for some time been a foreign-policy priority for China. In 2005, China celebrated the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s voyages, something that in Chinese history is viewed as an era in which Chinese civilization was spread and attempts were made to maintain international order. Numerous articles in China reflected this perspective and reiterated China’s promise of ‘no occupation’ and for the good of the international maritime system. The focus on international shipping routes was evident already in the 2006 National Defence white paper. This was already then viewed as ‘crucial to their political survival’. Later, some observers and academics, for instance Zhengyu Wu just recently, as well as some authors in the 2018 book ‘India & China at Sea’ , argue this shift is mainly initiated by the thoughts and plans of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is entirely logical that this naval strategic focus on sea lines of communication and interests overseas is linked to BRI. However, the naval strategic shift was evident before the BRI plans became concrete from 2013 onward. Wu is still correct in stressing that the explicit wording of the Maritime Strategy of 2015 and later documents, e.g. the 2017 ‘China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’ white paper, clearly find rationale in and overlap with the BRI efforts. However, there are also wider rationales for the Chinese strong investment in a naval build-up, stemming from what they label as an increasingly ‘competitive security environment’, as well as the old defensive notions.

Many have debated the underlying competition with the US, the dominant actor on the global high seas as well as in most regional waters. The debates on the naval balance outlook are in fact symptomatic of the broader debates over Sino-US relations, and whether ‘rising China’ is becoming a strategic competitor or a responsible stakeholder in international affairs. This has been debated for more than a decade, and still engages national positions on China in European politics. Despite a hawkish US debate today, in which many seem to believe in a coming hard power confrontation, some still argue that a more likely middle way of cooperation and competition will prevail. As an example of an often used ‘Mahanian’ perspective, Robert Ross states that ‘China’s rapidly expanding naval capabilities and its maritime activism attest to its resolve to challenge U.S. maritime supremacy in East Asia and become a world-class naval power’. He links this to Chinese nationalism, by discussing it in the perspective of President Xi Jinping’s ‘China dream’ ideas of modernisation of the nation and its restored great power status. From the 2015 Maritime Strategy, we clearly see that the Chinese naval developments are supposed to support the grand strategic ideas of celebrating the ‘two centenaries’, which in fact have been stressed by Xi Jinping since the 18th Congress in 2012, and first talked about back in the late 1990s. Many have made similar parallels to Xi’s statements on ‘realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nations’. Again, a statement open for contextual debates. However, as for regional affairs, it should be noted that the Maritime Strategy states that the Taiwan issue is central to China’s course of national rejuvenation, and that a reunification is inevitable.

The 2015 Maritime Strategy

Even though the Chinese Navy has gradually gained more independence as a Service, the Armed Forces overall are clearly under strong control and were created to support the grand strategic objectives of the State and the Communist Party. At the time of the launch of the Maritime Strategy in 2015, it was clearly stated, by the official State Council Information Office, that:

‘Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive and security guarantee for China’s peaceful development. Subordinate to and serving the national strategic goal, China’s military strategy is an overarching guidance for blueprinting and directing the building and employment of the country’s armed forces’.

As argued by Yoshihara and Holmes, this was only an continuation of the former years development.

China’s increasingly global aspirations have led to a military rise. This is evident from overarching political statements, including President Xi Jinping’s statement on the modernization of China’s Armed Forces by 2035, and from the clearly expressed ambition of achieving ‘a world-class military’ by the mid-century (2049) as announced at the 19th Communist Party Congress in October 2017. These declarations are in line with statements appearing in the first official Chinese Military Strategy published in 2015, in which intentions of global reach for securing its ‘overseas interests concerning energy and resources’ and ‘strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs)’ are also spelled out. Interestingly, the official English translation of the Maritime Strategy refers to ‘open sea protection’ for the Chinese term ‘yuanhai humei’. Literally, the term translates to ‘distant ocean convoy’, which gives a more precise picture of what the strategy is referring to.

The Strategy also emphasises that this era, in which profound changes are taking place in the international landscape, provides for strategic opportunities – basically describing this a period in which ‘much can be achieved’. It explicitly states that China’s Armed Forces should create favourable strategic postures, with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and means.

The following strategic tasks are given to the Chinese Armed Forces, to which the Navy is central:

Safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territorial land, air and sea;
Safeguard the unification of the motherland;
Safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests;
Maintain strategic deterrence.

It also includes wider tasks of supporting regional and global peace; safeguarding against separatism and terrorism; as well as conducting emergency rescue, disaster relief and guard duties. Additionally, the Army will further continue to reorient itself from traditional theatre defense to trans-theatre mobility, a task that will require air support for limited operations, but above all considerable naval and wider maritime support for extensive ‘strategic projection’ operations at distance.

With reference to the strategic requirements, the Navy is tasked to gradually shift its focus to a combination of ‘offshore water defense’ and ‘open sea protection’, and to build a multi-functional and efficient marine combat structure. From the wider white papers (e.g. the 2017 ‘China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’), it is evident that China wants to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity, including Taiwan, as well as build a strong national Armed Forces to support ‘China’s international standing’, and is ‘committed to upholding regional maritime security and order’.

From a sea power perspective, there is little resembling a ‘Mahanian’ naval thinking in the official documents and plans that are available. The same can be said for the naval forces we see being developed; the offensive power projection capabilities are of limited range (in numbers) and the long-range larger naval combatants are usable for sea lines of communication protection rather than for fighting a peer competitor at range. Consequently, the resemblance is much greater to the thinking of Corbett than that of Mahan in the present conditions.

The status of its naval capabilities today

In examining the trends in naval developments and political statements on making China a ‘world leading fighting force’ by 2049, we see that they have already changed the balance of power in the region, notably the South China Sea. If China continues to pursue its politically stated goals and fulfils the ambitions set forth in its 2015 Military Strategy, the implications in the future will be global. However, it’s worth noting that China’s naval modernization and build-up have been gradual and incremental.

The major cultural shift in the Chinese Armed Forces is the significance attributed to the use of the seas and oceans. The 2015 Military Strategy is very clear in this respect: ‘The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.’ China is to become a ‘maritime power’, and the forces should be prepared for military struggle (popularly named ‘PMS’), meaning it must meet the requirement of being capable of ‘fighting and winning wars’.

For China, as for the rest of the major powers, nuclear deterrence is fundamental in the great power standoff. However, China has limited itself to a ‘minimum nuclear deterrent strategy’. Still, its nuclear deterrent forces have been modernized over the last decade and its SLBMs are reasonably modern and well protected within its ‘first island chain’ defences. Chinese leaders have for a long time spoken openly of China’s ambitions of regional sea control (which also include air and sea denial) out to these islands, encompassing the waters from the Aleutian Island chain down past the Kuriles and Ryukyus to the disputed Spratly Islands (artificial, Chinese made) archipelago in the South China Sea. However, it is also important to note that for Liu Huaqing, these ‘island chains’ where seen as much as an obstacle that needed to be overcome, as a potential for defensive purposes.

Furthermore, challenging the US and allies’ dominance around the ‘second island chain’, including the Ogasawara and Volcano Islands of Japan, the Philippines, and the US island of Guam has been seen as part of Chinese ambitions and anti-submarine warfare for some years. This ‘second island chain’ ambition clearly overlaps with the US’ and Japan’s security domains.

These ambitions, of which the ‘first island’ strategy at least has become a reality in Chinese thinking, have driven the Chinese Navy to develop regional offensive capabilities. Considering the Chinese naval force balance today, their offensive capabilities are capable of fulfilling at least sea denial – and possibly regional sea control, as well as power projection for enforcing sovereignty and territorial claims.

As for the status of the Chinese aircraft carrier program today, it is still probably only in its infancy. China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, can operate only smaller fighter jets, and is mainly used as a research and development, and training platform. This latter fact should give promises of more to come. On the other side, many researchers also argue against the ‘deterministic’ views of a rising Chinese Navy. Its continued rise is in the first place dependent upon the future intentions of the State, and intentions are difficult to assess, and they do change over time in relation to the changing strategic environment and economic possibilities. In 2017 China launched its second but first to be built domestically aircraft carrier, the Type 001A. It is powered by conventional steam turbines, which makes it slower than nuclear-powered carriers. After sea trials and the arrival of its full air complement, the yet-to-be-named carrier is expected to be operational by 2020-21. A third aircraft carrier, the Type 002, is under construction in Shanghai. As the latter one is also expected to be a medium size, conventional carrier, these first capital ships would be of limited use in decisive naval battles at range. The first nuclear powered carrier is loosely estimated to become operational by 2030, however, this is very uncertain to western analysts, maybe even Chinese politicians at this time.

In conclusion, not yet a navy for “Command of the Sea”

Central and influential US researcher do clearly point out a deterministic future development, with often references to Mahan, of China challenging the US at sea. In the words of Yoshihara and Holmes, “Mahan’s logic of maritime strategy directs Beijing to court access to suppliers of raw materials and consumers of Chinese products – and most regions critical to Chinese economic health and vitality lie beyond the first island chain”. Clearly, from a US perspective, ‘Washington now faces its most dynamic and formidable competitor in modern history’. However, from a naval perspective, even though the Chinese represent a peer naval force in its own region, its global reach is still far from being at par with that of the US Navy and allies for decisive battles in ‘the far seas’. I do not argue against these expectations, however, they are not yet proven – and there is a long way to go for China to be able to challenge the US on the open seas.

Based on what we see today, the Chinese Navy does not yet have the capability to fight peer competitors at range, nor is it capable of longer range power projection in hostile waters. If the developments continue in the same pace as observed over the last two decades, China will soon be capable of effective force projection and naval diplomacy in times of peace and crisis, and to provide sea lines of communication protection for its maritime trade routes from China to the Middle East and Africa.

However, a blue water Navy ambition of becoming a peer competitor to the US – if that become apparent – will require a balanced naval fleet, air power and supporting infrastructures. Practically, to be able to operate at range, larger carrier forces are needed for protection and for power projection in a hostile environment. And such carrier fleets need to be complemented by a set of supporting forces. A large naval fleet requires air defence aircraft and proper airborne early warning planes, ships for missile defense and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, including submarines. Furthermore, to get value for the investment in aircraft carriers, they will most likely invest in the force projection capabilities of strike aircraft, but also longer range multipurpose amphibious assault ships (LHAs). Such ships are the largest of all amphibious warships, normally resembling a small aircraft carrier. China has produced new-generation under-way fast replenishment vessels (Type 901) with a primary role to support the increasing number of aircraft carriers.

In the ‘early phases’ of the Liu Huaqing to Wu Shengli eras, the Chinese naval focus was more comparable to Gorskhov’s thinking of wider maritime use, defensive sea and air denial forces, sea control of nearby waters and protection of strategic nuclear missile submarines. For these enduring important regional tasks of the Chinese Navy, which both is defensive and regionally offensive, the ideas of Gorshkov are still valuable for comparisons.

The gradual development of larger combatants and greater range capabilities for ‘far seas operations’; current Chinese naval thinking; and official white papers and strategies suggest a ‘Corbettian thinking’ – putting ‘the use of the sea’ in a global perspective at the centre.

Whether or not the Chinese naval thinking and ambitions will go beyond ‘the use of the sea’, to a higher level of ‘Command of the Sea’ and the capabilities to fight a peer competitor – a true ‘Mahanian’ ambition – remains to be seen. The first and main indicator to watch for early signs of ambitions of a true ‘Command of the Sea’ Mahanian navy is the type and number of aircraft carriers to be developed. If China one day announces its intention to build a fleet of nuclear-powered carriers, supported by larger organic logistical capabilities and a develops a network of maritime bases and harbours fit for both civilian and military purposes – then we are talking about a ‘Mahanian’-focused navy.

ENDNOTES

US DoD, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, Annual Report to Congress. Series from 2016 till 2019.
Fanell, James, ‘China’s global naval strategy and expanding force structure. Pathway to Hegemony’, Naval War College Review, Vol.72, No.1, Art.4, 2019.
Dyndal, Gjert Lage, ‘A theoretical framework of Maritime Air Power’, KKRVA, 2015 (4).
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), US Naval officer and professor. In 1890 Mahan published his college lectures as The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, a cornerstone of naval thinking.
Sir Julian S. Corbett (1854-1922), British geo-strategist and naval theorist. Most known for his book Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, but he wrote extensively on foreign and maritime policy and naval developments.
Corbett, Julian S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p.118.
Castex, Raoul, Strategic Theories (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp.184-202.
Sergei G. Gorshkov (1910-1988), Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union, the highest Soviet naval rank from 1967. Commander of the Soviet Union Navy from 1956-1985. Author of the Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamot, 1979).
The terminology ‘Jeune Ecole’ was introduced in 1884 by Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile. It advocated torpedo boats and fast commerce raiders (Castex, Strategic Theories, p.xiv). For a good account of the Jeune Ecole tradition, see Arne Røksund, The Jeune Ecole. The strategy of the weak (Boston: Brill, 2007).
Hobson, Rolf, Imperialism at Sea. Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875-1914 (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2002).
Dyndal, Gjert Lage, ‘The rise of the Soviet Navy, a re-visited Western view’, KKRVA, Nr 3 July/September 2013.
Li, Nan, ‘The Southern Theatre Command and China’s Maritime Strategy’, CPG, Issue 4, 2017.
Schuster, Carl Otis, ‘China. Its maritime tradition and navy today’, in Till, Geoffrey and Patrick Bratton, Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2012), p.57.
Harnett, Daniel, ‘The Father of the Modern Chinese Navy – Liu Huaqing’, CIMSEC, 8 October 2014.
For a comprehensive coverage of the Cold war era strategic developments, see: Fravel, M. Taylor, Active Defence. China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (New Jersey, US, Princeton University Press, 2019).
Cole, Bernard, Asia Maritime Strategies. Navigating Troubled Waters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 96-98.
Li, Nan, 2017.
Harnett, Daniel, ‘The Father of the Modern Chinese Navy – Liu Huaqing’, CIMSEC, 8 October 2014.
Much Sea Power debates have been on sea control. As with many other sea power theorists, also Liu Huaqing was ambiguous on the classic terms, including ‘sea control’ or ‘control’. Sun, Tom and Alex Payette, ‘China’s Two Ocean Strategy: Controlling waterways and the new silk road’, Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques (IRIS), Asia Focus #31, May 2017.
Lim, Yves-Heng, ‘Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.40, 2017.
Schuster, Carl Otis, ‘China. Its maritime tradition and navy today’, in Till, Geoffrey and Patrick Bratton, Sea Power and the Asia-Pasific (London: Routledge, 2012), p.57.
Lim, Yves-Heng, ‘Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.40, 2017.
Li, Nan and Christopher Weuve, ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier ambitions’, Naval War College Review, Winter 2010, Vol.63, No.1.
This view has been reflected in primarily US perspective all since the 1990s, see for instance: Goldman, Jeffrey B., ‘China’s Mahan’, Proceedings, March 1996; Holmes and Yoshihara’s Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century. The turn to Mahan (London: Routledge, 2008) has been much quoted; Cropsey, Seth and Arthur Milik ‘Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?’, World Affairs Journal, March 2012.
Harnett, Daniel, 2014.
Lim, Yves-Heng, 2007.
Harnett, Daniel, 2014.
Sun and Payette, 2017.
Roberts, Peter, ‘China’s 500-Ship Navy Suddenly Appears on the Horizon’, RUSI, 3 February 2017; see also Cole, Bernard, Asia Maritime Strategies. Navigating Troubled Waters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 96-98.
Holmes, James and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century. The turn to Mahan (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 88.
Kondapalli, Srikanth, ‘China’s Evolving Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean Region’, in Brewster, David, India & China at Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 111-113.
Sun and Payette, 2017; see also Cole, Bernard, Asia Maritime Strategies. Navigating Troubled Waters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 97.
Li, Nan and Christopher Weuve, ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier ambitions’, Naval War College Review, Winter 2010, Vol.63, No.1.
Li and Weuve, 2010; Fanell, 2019.
Sun and Payette, 2017.
Schuster, Carl Otis, ‘China. Its maritime tradition and navy today’, in Till, Geoffrey and Patrick Bratton, Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 64-66.
Sun and Payette, 2017.

See, Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/pictures/eglg45hdkjd/worlds-biggest-ports/#778e01c54c58 Downloaded 30 April 2019.

For a good discussion on the Chinese interests and the relationship to Russian in the Arctic, see: Røseth, Tom, Russia’s response to China’s rise (Oslo, PhD University of Oslo, 2017).
For a good discussion on the US perspective on China, and vice versa, see: Lanteigne, Marc, Chinese Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2020).
Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific (Annapolis, US, Naval Institute Press, 2018), p. 100.
Xiaoqin, Shi, ‘An Analysis of China’s Concept of Sea Power’, Asia Paper, ISDP, December 2011.
Kondapalli, p. 113.
Holmes and Yoshihara, p. 4.
Wu, Zhengyu, ‘Towards naval normalcy: ‘open seas protection’ and Sino-US maritime relations’, The Pacific Review, 14 February 2019.
Brewster, David, India & China at Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Se especially Ji, You, ‘The India Ocean’ in this book.
State Council Information Office Issues ‘China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’, White Paper, 11 January 2017.
For the most recent and thorough argumentation for this position, see: Fanell, 2019; as well as the related Annual Report to Congress, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 16 May 2018.
Goldstein, Lyle, ‘The US-China Naval Balance in the Asia-Pacific’, The China Quarterly, December 2017.
Ross, Robert, ‘Nationalism, geopolitics, and naval expansionism’, Naval War College Review, Autumn 2018, Vol.71, No.4.
State Council Information Office Issues ‘China’s Military Strategy’ – Bejing’s 1st White Paper on Military Strategy, 26 May 2015.
Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific, pp. 133-136.
Lim, Yves-Heng, ‘Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2007, 40:1-2, 146-168.
China’s Military Strategy, 2015.
State Council Information Office Issues ‘China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’, White Paper, 11 January 2017.
For an extensive discussion on the Chinese navy and the South China Sea problems, see: Corr, Anders ed., Great Powers, Grand Strategies. The new game in the South China Sea (Annapolis, US, Naval Institute Press, 2018).
China’s Military Strategy, 2015.
Cole, Bernard, Asia Maritime Strategies. Navigating Troubled Waters (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 97.
See for instance: Gilli, Andrea and Mauro Gilli, ‘Why China has not caught up yet’, International Security, Vol.43, No.3, Winter 2018/19; and Beckley, Michael, ‘The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia’, International Security, Vol.42, No.2, Fall 2017.
Pape, Alex and Tate Nurkin, “China’s Naval Strenght: Current and Future”, in Erickson, Andrew ed., Chinese Naval Shipbuilding (Annapolis, US, Naval Institute Press, 2016), p. 112.
Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific, p. 296.
Campbell, Kurt and Ely Ratner, ‘The China Reckoning’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2018.